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15 May 1991

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Items 29 and 68 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 15 May 1991 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 15 May 1991 from His Excellency Mr. Abdul Wakil, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan, addressed to you (see annex).

I have further the honour to request that the text of the present letter and its annex be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 29 and 68 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad E. ROSHAN-RAWAAN
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/46/50.

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ANNEX

Letter dated 15 May 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

Today, 15 May 1991, coincides with the third anniversary of the entering into force of the Geneva Agreements. Signed on 14 April 1988 by two independent States of equal rights, that is to say, the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Agreements represent the fruits of continued United Nations endeavours, particularly Your Excellency's personal efforts as the Secretary-General of this prestigious world body, as well as the mutual understanding reached between two great Powers on the settlement of one of the most complex regional conflicts through political means.

In accordance with the spirit of the Fourth document, that is, the "Agreement on Interrelationships Concerning the Solution of the Situation Related to Afghanistan", and on the basis of the timetable agreed upon by the Republic of Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops commenced on 15 May 1988 and the last Soviet soldier was out of Afghanistan even before the agreed upon date of 15 February 1989. Thus, the Republic of Afghanistan and the USSR completed in full their commitments in this regard two years and three months ago from today, a deed the appreciation of which was expressed by the international community, the United Nations, world public opinion and even by the other contracting side of the Agreements and their guarantor.

It is regrettable, however, on this third anniversary of the entering into force of the Geneva Agreements, to once again mention the fact that the Pakistani side has not honoured any of its commitments deriving from the Agreements. On the contrary, violating all principles of international law, it has expanded the dimensions of its interference and intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan to include the toppling down of State power in the country, the creation and the imposition on the people of Afghanistan of a regime of its own liking made in Pakistan and even the dismemberment and eradication of the independence of Afghanistan. Neglecting the "Bilateral Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations, Particularly on Non-interference and Non-intervention", Pakistan has not only continued to harbour and expand on its territory the military camps and depots of extremist Afghan opposition groups and to train, equip and dispatch such groups into the territory of Afghanistan and provide them with logistical support during their military operations, but by using its regular army, it has committed direct violent aggression on the territory of Afghanistan, including in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Kunar and most recently in Khost.

Instead of abiding by this Agreement, the spirit of which consists in the wish for "the normalization of the situation and the insurance of good-neighbourliness, as well as the strengthening of international peace and security in the region", and of resorting to finding solutions through

understanding and cooperation with the State of the Republic of Afghanistan, with which it had signed the Geneva Agreements, for removing difficulties, including the solution of problems related to the presence of Afghan refugees on the territory of Pakistan on the basis of the "Mutual Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees", Pakistan chose to create a so-called Shura and "the Interim Government of Afghan Mujahidin" under the supervision of the ISI (the Inter-Service Intelligence) and made every futile effort to export it by means of force into the territory of Afghanistan. Whereas, in accordance with the sixth article of the Agreement on Interrelationships "as from 15 May 1988, there will be no interference and intervention in any form in the affairs of the parties", because of the reckless violation of this Agreement by Pakistan and the encouragement by Pakistan, the fratricidal war has been for the last three years continuing in our country and thousands of innocent people, including women, children and the elderly, have been killed by those deadly weapons which have been put in the hands of the warmonger extremists in the territory of Pakistan.

Obviously, these deadly weapons, among them, long-range rockets, which during the course of the last three years since the conclusion of the Geneva Accords have been fired by extremists on cities and other residential areas, are not manufactured inside Afghanistan nor they are flown into Afghanistan through the atmosphere or via a territory of a third country.

The violation of the Geneva Agreements by Pakistan is so obvious and naked that it needs no further explanation. It would be enough to mention the 1,914 notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan, in which 13,781 cases of violations by that country were brought to the attention of the Secretary-General through the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) and, later on, of the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP).

The widespread Pakistani interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan, particularly the participation of army and paramilitary forces and commandoes of that country in the campaign of the months of February and April of 1989, as well as during the months of February and April of the current year, compelled the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan to appeal to the United Nations and in April 1989 to the United Nations Security Council. During the meeting of the Security Council, Afghanistan, by providing the international community with the facts on the violation of the Geneva Agreements by Pakistan and on its aggression against the territory of Afghanistan, informed the international community of the repercussions of Pakistani recklessness towards internationally recognized norms. It also requested it to press Pakistan to respect the letter and spirit of the Geneva Agreements, under which it has the obligation to stop aggression, interference and intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan, and not to endanger further the peace and stability of the region.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan, while fully and honestly fulfilling its obligations under the Geneva Agreements, and being compelled to defend the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country in the face of Pakistani military plots, has in the meantime, by seeking and launching a policy of peace and reconciliation between Afghans, endeavoured to take steps toward democratizing the political, economic and social life of the country. In order to pave the way for intra-Afghan dialogue and settling the disputes between the parties involved through negotiations, the Afghan Government has put forward numerous constructive, reasonable and flexible proposals.

Based on its peaceful foreign policy, of which the principle of friendship and cooperation among all the countries, above all, among the neighbouring countries, is the major element and, despite the pursuance of the aggressive and expansionist policy by Pakistan, the Republic of Afghanistan recently raised the idea of normalizing and improving relations with that country. Regrettably, the Government of Pakistan, as in the past, continues its violation of the Geneva Agreements and of the Charter of the United Nations. Attacking the city of Khost by the Pakistani armed, artillery and commando forces in the month of April is one of the recent instances of the policy of Pakistan vis-à-vis Afghanistan.

On the occasion of the third year of the entering into force of the Geneva Agreements, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan, I should like to mention with appreciation the efforts and good offices of the Secretary-General towards finding a peaceful way of solving the Afghan problem, and once again appeal to and draw the attention of the world body and its Secretary-General to the urgent need of taking effective measures for the full implementation of the Geneva Agreements and for halting the continuation of the Pakistani interference and hostility vis-à-vis Afghanistan.

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15 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 MAY 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government and further to our previous letters, I have the honour to bring the following serious Iraqi violations of the terms of cease-fire between Iran and Iraq to your attention.

Iraq's violations of the terms of cease-fire between that country and the Islamic Republic of Iran have been duly taken up with Iraqi officials. In view of the internal turmoil in Iraq and the external difficulties it faces, we have patiently strived to deal with these violations bilaterally in the capitals of the two countries and at the borders. The Islamic Republic of Iran has exercised maximum self-restraint in managing consistent Iraqi violations so as to preclude further escalation. We are determined to continue this approach, aiming to de-escalate tension at the borders. In this context, we cannot but continue to press the Iraqi authorities to put an immediate end to these violations of the terms of cease-fire between the two countries.

1. On 4 April 1991, an Iranian 214 helicopter, owing to adverse weather conditions, landed in the vicinity of an Iraqi border post in Fakkeh region. An Iranian non-commissioned officer, Ali Asghar Mahmudi, who got off the helicopter to identify the area, was captured by several armed Iraqi forces. Realizing its mistake, the helicopter immediately returned.

2. On 25 April 1991, an Iraqi armoured battalion and two infantry battalions advanced from the east of Basra between Shalamcheh and Adab-Bast canal towards the border line at the geographic coordinates of TP 148-757 on the map of Khorramshahr, firing 35 tank shells, 15 artillery shells and several rocket-launcher shells against the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

3. On 27 April 1991, six Iraqi forces from the 443rd infantry brigade penetrated into the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the geographic coordinates of ND 708-948 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin. They were taken captive by the Iranian border guards.

4. On 3 May 1991, at 1500 hours, Iraqi forces shelled Iranian territory with a 23mm cannon. The geographic coordinates of NE-393-873 on the map of Sardasht were hit by Iraqi cannon shells.

5. On 4 May 1991, at 0130 hours, Iraqi forces fired several 60mm rocket-launcher shells at the geographic coordinates of ND 474-226 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

6. On 5 May 1991, Iraqi forces stationed about 80 to 90 soldiers in the no man's land at the geographic coordinates of ND 477-214 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter was circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Javad ZARIF
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

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General Assembly Security Council

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16 May 1991
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Items 29 and 68 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 15 May 1991 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the third anniversary of the entry into force of the Geneva Agreements on Afghanistan.

I request you to have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 29 and 68 of the preliminary list, and also of the Security Council.

(Signed) Y. VORONTSOV

* A/46/50.

ANNEX

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the third anniversary of the entry into force of the Geneva Agreements on Afghanistan

Three years ago, on 15 May, the return home of the Soviet military contingent from Afghanistan began in accordance with the Geneva Agreements. The withdrawal of Soviet troops, which was carried out exactly according to schedule and within the dates set, once again demonstrated the Soviet Union's conscientious and honest attitude with regard to the obligations that it has undertaken and its respect for international documents which it has signed.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan also acted in a similar way, not only strictly and unswervingly observing the articles and provisions of the agreement on non-interference signed with Pakistan, but also creating all the necessary conditions for ensuring the return of Afghan refugees to the country. All this was supplemented with flexible and constructive proposals designed to bring about national reconciliation and a political settlement of the problem in Afghanistan, which were put forward by both the Afghan leaders and the Soviet side as the guarantor of the Geneva Agreements. This created the necessary conditions for halting the fratricidal war and establishing peace in the long-suffering land of Afghanistan, which became feasible after April 1988, that is, after the conclusion of the Geneva Agreements.

Unfortunately, these agreements and the subsequent concrete, purposeful steps taken by Kabul and Moscow could not put an end to the bloodshed in Afghanistan, mainly because of the obstructionist policy of those forces which became involved in the Afghan conflict, first of all Pakistan. Although the withdrawal of Soviet troops was completed long ago, interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and the rendering of broad assistance to the armed Afghan opposition from the territory of Pakistan have not only not ceased, but are even tending to increase. The recent events connected with Khost, during which the Pakistani armed forces provided direct military support to the Afghan "Mujahidin", are an example of this.

In the time since the completion of the return home of the Soviet troops, much has been done through the active efforts of the Republic of Afghanistan, the USSR, Iran and the United States with considerable assistance from the United Nations in order to achieve a political settlement in Afghanistan; and, in particular, an international consensus has begun to emerge with regard to the basic principles for such a settlement. The Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan believe that any settlement, which can be achieved only by the Afghans themselves, through an intra-Afghan dialogue, must be based on the rejection of the use of force, a reasonable and just compromise, consideration of the real situation and a balance of the interests of the opposing sides. The lack of an alternative to a political settlement is today in fact recognized by all, except the most extremist-minded faction of the "Peshawar

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Seven", which is becoming increasingly isolated from the clear-thinking faction of the Afghan political opposition.

In the situation that has come about, a sober approach free of all anger is more than ever necessary with regard to the Afghan problem. A double standard here is not only out of place, but also detrimental because it can only stall the positive progress which has recently been made in the course of contacts with various sides on the Afghan problem and impede a qualitative breakthrough towards an Afghan settlement. Such a breakthrough is completely possible provided that the Afghan opposition and those who support it renounce the imposition of ultimatums on the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan to withdraw from the political arena, which are combined with methods of exerting pressure through force.

Much in this regard depends on the countries which are supporting the opposition and whose views it must take into consideration. If they were able to induce the members of the opposition to halt the escalation of military activities and undertake a peaceful dialogue with the opposite side, the process to bring about a settlement would begin. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will be prepared also in the future, in cooperation with the Afghan side, to do everything to ensure that a settlement is really brought about.

We hold sacred the memory of the soldiers and officers who were killed in the land of Afghanistan. The USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs, together with other Soviet agencies, is making every effort to clear up the fate of the Soviet servicemen who are missing in Afghanistan and bring about the release from captivity of those who fell into the hands of the Afghan armed opposition. Their fate is a matter of profound concern for all Soviet people. We would like to hope that the entire world community will provide support and assistance in solving this humanitarian problem.

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S/22608
17 May 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 16 MAY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to our letters, the most recent being our letter No. 102 of 12 May 1991, I have the honour to state further facts regarding Iranian acts of violation of the provisions of the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran, as follows:

1. On 4 April 1991, the Iranian side advanced a force estimated at one infantry platoon to the area of hill 426 in the central sector inside Iraqi territory.

2. At 2308 hours on 12 May 1991, an Iranian patrol consisting of 10 to 15 men infiltrated 6 kilometres inside Iraqi territory, attacked the Iraqi units stationed in front of the Kani Sakht control post in the Zurbatiyah area of the central sector and then withdrew inside Iranian territory.

These fresh violations, which are added to the previous repeated Iranian violations of the cease-fire between the two countries, once again confirm the persistence of the Iranian Government in its deliberate endeavour to encroach upon the sovereignty and security of Iraq. The Government of my country stresses, as it has done on previous occasions, that the Iranian Government is responsible for all the damage caused by these violations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22609
17 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 MAY 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ANGOLA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to request Your Excellency that the letter dated 8 May 1991 from His Excellency Mr. Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem, Minister for External Relations, be circulated as a document of the United Nations Security Council.

(Signed) Apolinario CORREIA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Letter dated 8 May 1991 from the Minister for External Relations of Angola to the Secretary-General

As you are aware, the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) signed on 1 May 1991 a set of documents that establish the principles for the implementation of peace in Angola.

Accordingly, I would like formally to communicate this fact and, in the meantime, I would like to request that Your Excellency take action in order to ensure the participation of the United Nations in verifying the implementation of the Accords, to which both sides have agreed.

Therefore, I would like to request Your Excellency to inform the Security Council of the necessity to keep the forces of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) until the realization of the general elections that will take place between September and November 1992.

Although the said Accords will be in force after the formal signature at the end of this month, the cessation of the hostilities must be verified "in fact" as of 15 May 1991, at which date the mechanisms of verification should be started.

Attached please find a copy of the rubricated Accords.

Pedro de Castro VAN-DUNEM
Minister for External Relations

Enclosure

Peace Accords for Angola

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), with mediation by the Government of Portugal and the participation of observers from the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Accept as binding the following documents, which constitute the Peace Accords for Angola:

(a) The cease-fire agreement (including annexes I and II thereto) [see attachment I];

(b) Fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola (including the annex thereto regarding the Joint Political-Military Commission) [see attachment II];

(c) Concepts for resolving the issues still pending between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA [see attachment III];

(d) The Protocol of Estoril [see attachment IV].

These peace accords were initialled on 1 May 1991 by the respective heads of delegation and subsequently approved by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA (as evidenced in the communication addressed to the Prime Minister of Portugal not later than 12 midnight on 15 May 1991, which entailed the de facto suspension of hostilities in Angola beginning on that date), and will enter into force immediately following their signature.

_____

President of the People's
Republic of Angola

_____

President of the National
Union for the Total
Independence of Angola

Lisbon, ... May 1991

Attachment I

Cease-fire Agreement

I. DEFINITION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. The cease-fire consists of the cessation of hostilities between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA with a view to attaining peace throughout the national territory.

2. The cease-fire must be total and definitive throughout the national territory.

3. The cease-fire must guarantee the free circulation of persons and goods throughout the national territory.

4. Overall supervision of the cease-fire will be the responsibility of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA acting within the framework of the Joint Political-Military Commission (Commissão Conjunta Político-Militar (CCPM)) created pursuant to the annex to the document entitled "Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola". The United Nations will be invited to send monitors to support the Angolan parties, at the request of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola.

5. The cease-fire includes the cessation of all hostile propaganda between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA at both the domestic and international levels.

6. After its entry into force, the cease-fire will obligate the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA to refrain from acquiring lethal material. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics informed the Government of the People's Republic of Angola that they will support implementation of the cease-fire by ceasing to supply lethal material to any Angolan party and encouraging other countries to act in a similar fashion.

II. ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE

1. Full entry into force of the cease-fire entails strict observance of the commitments assumed by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA as well as of the decisions made by bodies having the authority to verify and monitor the cease-fire.

2. Observance of the cease-fire shall not endanger logistical supplies of non-lethal material for the military forces present [in the area].

3. The cease-fire entails the release of all civilian and military prisoners who were detained as a consequence of the conflict between the Government of

the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA. Verification of such release will be performed by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

4. The cease-fire applies to all foreign forces present in Angolan territory.

5. Entry into force of the cease-fire shall not endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola.

6. The cease-fire will, beginning on the date and time agreed upon for its entry into force, entail the cessation of:

(a) All armed air, land or sea attacks, as well as all actions of sabotage;

(b) All offensive movement of troops or armed groups;

(c) Attempts to occupy new ground positions and the movement of military forces and resources from one area to another without prior agreement between the parties;

(d) All military manoeuvres aimed at installing weapons with the capability to endanger the safety of settlements and the economic, administrative and military infrastructures;

(e) Patrol activities outside the areas to be demarcated around the areas of assembly for the troops of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA;

(f) All acts of violence against the civilian population;

(g) The planting of new mines and actions aimed at impeding activities to deactivate mines;

(h) Unjustified restrictions or impediments on the free circulation of persons and goods;

(i) Any other actions that may impede the normal evolution of the cease-fire process;

(j) Receipt of lethal material, regardless of its origin.

7. Failure to observe any of the provisions set forth above constitutes a violation of the cease-fire, without prejudice to decisions made by the verification and monitoring groups in the performance of their duties.

III. VERIFICATION AND MONITORING

1. Prior to entry into force of the cease-fire, a Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (Comissão Mista de Verificação (CMVF)) will be formed. It will be composed of representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA, as members, and of representatives of Portugal, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as observers. In addition, a United Nations representative will be invited to the CMVF meetings.

2. CMVF will report to the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM).

3. CMVF will have the authority to create any structures it considers appropriate for the performance of its duties, namely the monitoring groups necessary for full observance of the cease-fire throughout Angolan territory. Such groups shall be subordinate to CMVF.

4. The monitoring groups, which will be established before entry into force of the cease-fire, will be composed of an equal number of representatives from the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA.

5. United Nations personnel, who will have their own command structure, will verify whether the monitoring groups are assuming their responsibilities. This will include United Nations support in the investigation and resolution of alleged cease-fire violations. The Governments that will be sending United Nations monitors will be selected with the participation of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA, working within the framework of CCPM.

6. The bodies and mechanisms created to verify and monitor the cease-fire will be temporary in nature and will cease to exist at the end of the cease-fire [period].

7. Other provisions with respect to verification and monitoring of the cease-fire are set forth in annex I to this agreement.

IV. REGULATING THE VERIFICATION AND MONITORING MEASURES

1. CMVF will have the authority necessary to ensure the effective observance of the cease-fire. Particularly, it shall familiarize itself with the areas of troop assembly, monitor compliance with the rules of conduct previously agreed on for the troops in the areas of assembly, coordinate the activity of the monitoring groups, and rule on the complaints and claims presented in relation to possible violations of the cease-fire.

2. CMVF will decide on its own regulations, and also has the authority to define the functions and approve the regulations of such monitoring groups as it may establish.

3. The monitoring groups will make "on site" verifications of observance of the cease-fire. Specifically, they are to prevent, verify and investigate possible violations.

V. TIMETABLE OF THE CEASE-FIRE

1 May - Initialling of the Accord

By midnight on 15 May - Notification to be sent to the Portuguese Government of acceptance by the parties.

Midnight 15 May - "de facto" suspension of hostilities.

29-31 May	(a)	Signature and entry into force of the cease-fire agreement;
	(b)	CCPM and CMVF take office;
	(c)	The monitoring groups begin to travel to the pre-determined sites;
	(d)	Beginning of the United Nations verification operations.
15 June	(a)	Completion of the establishment of the monitoring groups at the pre-determined sites, and notification to CMVF that they are operational;
	(b)	The monitoring system begins to function.
By 30 June		Completion of installation of the United Nations verification system.
1 July		Forces begin to move to the areas of assembly. The verification and monitoring groups must be notified in advance of each movement of forces.
1 August		Completion of the movement of forces to the areas of assembly.
On the date of the elections		Completion of the cease-fire process and abolition of the verification and monitoring bodies.

Note. The sequence of tasks to be performed during the different phases of the cease-fire appears in annex II.

Annex I

Verification and monitoring of the cease-fire

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA hereby agree to the following provisions regarding the verification and monitoring of the cease-fire:

A. THE CMVF MANDATE AND REGULATIONS

1. The Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) is the entity responsible for the implementation and functioning of the mechanisms instituted to verify and exercise control over the cease-fire, provided for in the documents signed on this subject. Particularly, it is responsible for:

(a) Verifying that the monitoring groups necessary for full observance of the cease-fire throughout the national territory have been established. These groups shall be subordinate to CMVF;

(b) Establishing the needed coordination with the special bodies in the United Nations system of cease-fire verification;

(c) Becoming familiar with the troop assembly areas;

(d) Checking that the rules of conduct agreed upon in advance for the troops in their areas of assembly are being observed;

(e) Ruling on any complaints and claims presented to it regarding possible violations of the cease-fire;

(f) Defining the specific sphere of authority of the monitoring groups, approving the regulations for those groups, and coordinating their activities;

(g) Analysing and discussing the periodic reports that the monitoring groups are required to send to it, through the regional monitoring groups, concerning the manner in which the measures implementing the cease-fire are being applied within their area of jurisdiction;

(h) Adopting such mechanisms as may be considered necessary to the exercise of its functions, including the creation of ad hoc investigative commissions that may travel to the site of the possible violations;

(i) Verifying the observance by both parties of the principle that their paramilitary or militarized forces have been demobilized or integrated into the respective regular military forces.

2. CMVF shall be composed of representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and of UNITA as members, and by representatives of Portugal, the United States and the Soviet Union as observers.

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3. A representative of the United Nations shall also be invited to participate in the meetings of CMVF.

4. The meetings of CMVF shall be presided over, alternately in accordance with the principle of rotation, by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and by UNITA, without prejudice to the principle of consensus in the decision-making process.

5. CMVF, with headquarters at Luanda, shall have a delegation at Jamba.

6. CMVF shall meet in ordinary session at least three times a week for the purposes of part (g) of No. 2 [sic], and in special session whenever any of the parties requests that it be convened to analyse possible violations of the cease-fire.

7. The decisions of CMVF shall be made by consensus between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA.

8. The decisions of CMVF shall be binding in nature, and the parties shall take all measures necessary to execute them.

9. It is mandatory that the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) be notified of decisions reached by CMVF on non-procedural matters. CCPM may request such clarifications as it deems appropriate regarding those decisions.

10. In the event that CMVF does not reach a decision, or that CCPM objects to that decision, the final decision shall rest with the latter body.

11. Minutes of the CMVF meetings shall always be prepared, and signed by the representatives of the parties.

12. The decisions of CMVF shall be confidential in nature, unless CMVF itself or CCPM decides otherwise.

13. CMVF shall cease functioning at the end of the cease-fire.

B. THE VERIFICATION AND MONITORING SYSTEM

1. On-site monitoring of the cease-fire is assured by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and by UNITA, through monitoring groups subordinate to CMVF that are to be composed of 8 to 12 individuals from each party, in accordance with the organizational chart that appears in appendix 1.

2. There will be monitoring groups at all the sites indicated in appendices 2 and 3. Additional monitoring groups may be created, to be directly subordinate to CMVF and the regional monitoring groups.

3. Liaison between CMVF and the monitoring groups is assured by the regional monitoring groups, for which purpose the territory of Angola shall be divided into the following regions and subregions:

- Northern Region (with headquarters at Luanda), with two subgroups located at Negage and Cabinda;

- Northeastern Region (with headquarters at Saurimo);

- Central Region (with headquarters at Huambo), with two subgroups located at Lobito and Huambo;

- Eastern Region (with headquarters at Luena);

- Southeastern Region (with headquarters at Mavinga);

- Southern Region (with headquarters at Lubango).

4. United Nations personnel, who will have their own command structure, will verify whether the monitoring groups are assuming their responsibilities. This will include United Nations support in the investigation and resolution of alleged cease-fire violations.

5. Coordination with the United Nations verification and monitoring system shall be arranged at all levels of the existing administrative structures.

6. The security of the monitoring groups and all United Nations personnel shall be the responsibility of the party that controls the zone where they are present.

7. The commanders of the areas of assembly shall provide all support requested of them by the cease-fire verification and monitoring bodies and by the United Nations.

8. The cease-fire monitoring and verification bodies shall enjoy complete freedom of movement in carrying out their duties.

9. Every member of the cease-fire monitoring and verification bodies shall display a badge and a credential that easily identifies him, and shall travel unarmed.

C. THE AREAS OF ASSEMBLY

1. All the armed forces shall be assembled 60 days following the entry into force of the cease-fire, in the areas specified in appendix 2. In so far as possible, those areas shall be situated away from major population centres.

2. An organic unit, with its allotment of personnel and materials, shall be situated in each area of assembly.

3. Each area of assembly shall have a contingent of troops numbering at least 100 men.

4. The areas of assembly shall be surrounded by security zones having a maximum radius of 10 kilometres. The parties shall notify the monitoring groups as to the distance they are actually adopting for each of those areas.

5. Within the respective areas of assembly, the forces of both parties shall fully respect the rules of conduct contained in appendix 4.

D. SUPPLIES

1. Supplies for the areas of assembly of each of the parties are to be inspected.

2. Each party shall ensure the logistics of its own forces in the initial phase, although they may coordinate the respective actions. In the second phase, that of the formation of the Angolan armed forces, the supply process shall be joint. The responsibility for providing logistical support to those troops that are not integrated into the Angolan armed forces shall rest with each of the parties until those troops have been demobilized.

3. CMVF shall decide on the modes of notification or determination of the logistical itineraries.

E. BORDER POSTS

1. Border control posts shall be created, and staffed jointly as indicated in appendix 5.

2. Each party may assign forces to these posts in numbers not to exceed the equivalent of a platoon (of 30 men) and shall be free to determine the nature of those forces.

F. PARAMILITARY FORCES

1. The paramilitary or militarized forces of both parties shall have been demobilized or integrated into the respective regular military forces by the time the cease-fire enters into force.

2. It shall be the responsibility of CMVF to verify the observance of the principle set forth in the previous provision.

G. INFORMATION OF A MILITARY NATURE

Between the signature of the cease-fire and the beginning of the monitoring thereof, both parties shall exchange, within the framework of CMVF, the military information contained in appendix 6.

H. CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARSENAL

After entry into force of the cease-fire, the parties agree to conduct investigations to determine whether this type of material exists, or ever did exist and was used.

Appendix 1

Monitoring system, organizational charts



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
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LUANDA - ↓
B. QUANDA - ↓
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MUSSULO - ↓
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DONDO - O
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(CABINDA)
(1-A)

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
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NECUTO - O
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CHIMQUANDE - O
2P
MASSABI - △
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
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SOYO - ↓
NOQUI - ↓
QUIMBAU - ↓
N'ZETO - ↓
HUSSEMA - ↓
AMBAIZ - ↓
SOYO - O
N'GALA - O.∞
KINDEGE - O
DUNGO - O
NEGAGE - O
QUIPEDRO - O
KOTA - O
MALANJE - O.∞
CAPANDA - O
ZP
LUVO - △
NOQUI - △
BUELA - △
QUINGATA - △
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
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CHITATO - ∞
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
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CHIUITE
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CATUMBELA
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C LODO
PANBOIA
SUMBE
EGIPTO P.
BTAGIA
GF
SAMBOO
CAMBAMBAO
ANDULO
BAILUNDO
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HUAMBO
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
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CUENCA - O
CAJAMARCA - O
CAJAMBO - O - ∞
CALLAO - O
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HARCOS - △
LUAU - △
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
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MAHIBE
BATIABA
B. TIGRES
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CASSINGA - ∞
P. CULONGE - Δ
CUITADO - Δ
DICUICADO - Δ
MAHIBE - O
LUBANGO - O
MATALA - O
HENGUE - O - ∞
CAHAMA - O - ∞
MUCUIO - O


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LICUA - 00
GF
JAMBA - 00
2P
MUSSUMA
2P
MUCUSSO
2P
PUABUATA
2P
CALAI
2P
DIRICO
2P
CUANGAR
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AIVUNGO

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Key

CCPM	Comissão Conjunta Político-Militar [Joint Political-Military Commission]
CMVF	Comissão Mista de Verificação e Fiscalização [Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission]
Gr Ligação	Liaison Group
Gr	Regional group
SGR	Regional subgroup
GF	Grupo de Fiscalização [Monitoring Group]
P	Platoon
○	Troop assembly area
↓	Ports (civilian or military)
∞	Airports or airstrips (civilian or military)
△	Border post

Appendix 2

Areas of assembly

	Locality	Government	UNITA
1.	Cabinda	*	
2.	Dinge	*	
3.	Negage	*	
4.	Luanda	*	
5.	Capanda	*	
6.	Malange	*	
7.	Dondo	*	
8.	Soyo	*	
9.	Luena	*	
10.	Cazombo	*	
11.	Saurimo	*	
12.	Cafunfo	*	
13.	Lucapa	*	
14.	Huambo	*	
15.	Lobito	*	
16.	Bié	*	
17.	Quibala	*	
18.	Andulo	*	
19.	Bailundo	*	
20.	N'Gove	*	
21.	Menongue	*	
22.	Cahama	*	
23.	Matala	*	
24.	Cuito Cuanavale	*	
25.	Namibe	*	
26.	M'Banza Congo	*	
27.	Lubango	*	
28.	Chimbuande		*
29.	Necutu		*
30.	Quipedro		*
31.	Kota		*
32.	Kindenge		*
33.	Bungo		*
34.	Banja		*
35.	Cambandua		*
36.	Sambo		*
37.	Lunge		*
38.	Mussende		*
39.	Nharea		*
40.	Soma Kuanza		*
41.	Chipindo		*
42.	Chiquite		*
43.	Mucuio		*

	Locality	Government	UNITA
44.	Cuemba		*
45.	Quirima		*
46.	Capaia		*
47.	Calunda		*
48.	Cangumbe		*
49.	Muconda		*
50.	Mavinga		*

Appendix 3

Airports and ports

Airports

1. Cabinda
2. Negage
3. Luanda
4. Malange
5. Luena
6. Cazombo
7. Saurimo
8. Lucapa
9. Huambo
10. Lobito
11. Caxito
12. Bié
13. Menongue
14. Cahama
15. Cuito Canavale
16. Namibe
17. M'Banza Congo
18. Lubango
19. Chitato
20. Luau
21. Uige
22. Ndalatando
23. Catumbela
24. Jamba Cassinga
25. N'Giva
26. Jamba
27. Licua
28. Lumbala Nguimbo
29. Cangamba
30. Munhango
31. Quimbele
32. Marimba

Ports

1. Cabinda
2. Luanda
3. Soyo
4. Lobito
5. Namibe
6. Noqui
7. Cancongo
8. Quinzau
9. N'Zeto
10. Musserra
11. Ambriz
12. Barra do Dande
13. Mussulo
14. Barra do Kuanza
15. Cabo Ledo
16. Porto Amboim
17. Sumbe
18. Baia Farta
19. Tombua
20. Baia dos Tigres
21. Egipto Praia
22. Bentiaba

Appendix 4

Rules of conduct for the troops in the areas of assembly

1. Command and liaison

(a) Each area of assembly shall have a military commander designated by the respective party;

(b) The military commander, regardless of the command structure to which he is subordinate, is responsible to the cease-fire monitoring bodies with regard to the following:

- Observance of the cease-fire agreements by the troops;
- Observance of directives and orders from the CCPM and the CMVF;
- Control of the armaments, ammunitions, and other matériel belonging to the units stationed in the area of assembly;

(c) The military commander is to establish liaison with the command to which he is subordinate and with the cease-fire monitoring bodies responsible for his area of assembly.

2. Opening and closing an area of assembly

(a) An area of assembly is to be opened and subject to these rules as of the date when the cease-fire enters into force, or as of the date the first military unit arrives in the area;

(b) The military commander is to send daily situation reports to the cease-fire monitoring bodies, specifying the personnel, matériel, and munitions on hand in the area and describing the pertinent activities, following a model to be defined by CMVF;

(c) An assembly area is to be closed prior to the date of the general elections and as soon as all the personnel, matériel, and munitions have received a final destination.

3. Activities of the troops

(a) No military person or civilian may leave the security perimeter of the area of assembly with weapons or munitions, unless he has received an order to that effect from the cease-fire verification and monitoring bodies;

(b) Individual units may leave the area of assembly only with the approval of the cease-fire verification and monitoring bodies;

(c) Individual members of the military may leave their area of assembly only with the authorization of the military commander of the area and with the knowledge of the cease-fire verification and monitoring bodies;

(c) [sic] The troops may engage in the following activities while in the areas of assembly:

- Military training according to programmes approved by the military commander of the area and cleared by the cease-fire verification and monitoring bodies;

- Resupply of foodstuffs, fuels and lubricants;

- Matériel maintenance and repair;

- Improvements to the infrastructure, and deactivation of mines in their area of assembly;

- Cultural and recreational activities.

(d) [sic] Troops present in the areas of assembly may not take an active part in partisan political and union activities.

4. Troop security

(a) The military units stationed in each area of assembly are to ensure their own local security;

(b) The security of each area of assembly is to be agreed upon between its military commander and the cease-fire verification and monitoring body responsible for the area.

5. Custody of the weapons and munitions

(a) In each area of assembly, the armaments and the munitions shall be gathered at collection points, warehouses, sheds and fields that are adequately controlled and guarded and subject to inspection by the cease-fire verification and monitoring bodies;

(b) Only those individual weapons and munitions necessary for local security services, in accordance with the provision of 4 (b) above, may be distributed to the personnel;

(c) Personnel shall be permitted access to the armaments in accordance with the maintenance and training programmes approved by the military commander and cleared by the cease-fire verification and monitoring bodies;

(d) The provision in No. 7 constitutes an exception to parts (a), (b) and (c).

6. Procedure to be followed in the event of incident or cease-fire violation

(a) The commanders of each echelon shall take immediate measures with their troops to quell any incident or violation;

(b) A commander who learns of any incident or violation is to warn the responsible party(ies) immediately and, if they belong to his unit, to take the appropriate disciplinary measures;

(c) The cease-fire verification and monitoring organs for the area are to be notified of every incident or violation, and it is their duty to determine responsibilities;

(d) The military commander also is to report every incident or violation to the next higher echelon in his chain of command;

(e) In the event of an incident or violation, the units shall refrain from retaliation and shall exert efforts to prevent an escalation;

(f) Without prejudice to the disciplinary measures mentioned in 6 (b) above, the responsible parties and perpetrators of incidents or violations are to be subject to sanctions applied by CMVF.

7. Final destination of the troops and matériel in the areas of assembly

(a) The troops in each area of assembly shall either be moved to training centres with a view to the formation of the Angolan armed forces, or shall be demobilized;

(b) The armaments, munitions and remaining matériel belonging to the units in each area of assembly are either to be moved to the training centres set up with a view to the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces, or delivered to warehouses. No demobilized individual shall be permitted to take any article of military matériel with him;

(c) The operations referred to in (a) and (b) shall be carried out in accordance with rules, directives and orders from CCPM and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces (CCFA), transmitted via the cease-fire verification and monitoring bodies and under the control thereof;

(d) The commander of each area of assembly is to notify the higher echelon to which he is subordinate of any movements of personnel and matériel effected pursuant to (a), (b) and (c);

(e) All troops and matériel from each area of assembly shall receive a final destination prior to the date of the elections.

Appendix 5

Border posts

1. Chimbuande
2. Necuto
3. Iema
4. Massabi
5. Miconge
6. Fubo
7. Noqui
8. Luvo
9. Buela
10. Quimbata
11. Beu Fiscal
12. Sacandica
13. Massau
14. Cuango
15. Quedas Franc. José
16. Zovo
17. Naumba
18. Chitato
19. Fucauma
20. Nordeste
21. Chiluage
22. Caianda
23. Gibme
24. Luau
25. Karipande
26. Mussuma
27. Mucusso
28. Buabuata
29. Calai
30. Dirico
31. Cuangar
32. Oichicango
33. Chitado
34. Chaundo
35. Marco 25
36. Rivungo
37. Foz do Cunene

Appendix 6

Military information to be exchanged between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

1. Personnel

   - Troops and organization of the forces (land, sea and air)

2. Equipment and armaments

   - Artillery
   - Combat vehicles
   - Air defence
   - Aircraft
   - Ships
   - Support vehicles
   - Light weapons
   - Engineering equipment

3. Others

   - Information of a logistical nature
   - Civilian and military prisoners resulting from the conflict

Annex II

Sequence of tasks in the different phases of the cease-fire

Preliminary phase (1-15 May 1991)

1 May 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Initialling of Cease-Fire Agreement

Cessation of hostile propaganda

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

United Nations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Observations

Appeal to the parties to exercise maximum restraint in their actions

15 May 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Last day to inform Portuguese Government which country(ies) will provide assistance in formation of Armed Forces

Last day to notify Portuguese Government of acceptance of Cease-Fire Agreement

De facto suspension of hostilities (12 midnight, 15 May 1991)

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

United Nations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Observations

Phase I (15-29/31 May 1991)

(Signature and entry into force of Agreement)

15 May 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Hostilities suspended since 12 midnight, 15 May

Commanders at all levels ensure that their troops stay in their positions and await orders

Offensive operations such as the following will not be conducted:

Military land or air reconnaissance and combat patrols within a 10-kilometre radius of their military bases

Overflight by combat aircraft or armed helicopters

Military operations against military, economic or civilian targets

Cessation of all military manoeuvres with the aim of placing weapons capable of endangering the security of towns and the economic, administrative and military infrastructures

Cessation of all acts of violence against the civilian population

Occupation of new positions

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

United Nations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Observations

15-31 May 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

29-31 May 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Last day for the Government and UNITA to inform their forces about the areas of assembly

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

Prior to signature of agreement, members of CMVF and the monitoring groups will be appointed

United Nations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Prior to signature of Cease-Fire Agreement, members of CCFA will be appointed

Observations

29-31 May 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Signature and immediate entry into force of Cease-Fire Agreement

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

United Nations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Observations

Cessation of supplies of lethal material to the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Phase II (31 May-30 June 1991)

(Implementation of the monitoring system)

31 May 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Beginning of exchange of military information within the framework of CMVF

Beginning of process of releasing all civilian and military prisoners taken as a result of the conflict

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

Immediately after signature and entry into force of accord, CCPM and CMVF take office

The monitoring groups begin to travel to the predetermined sites

United Nations

Beginning of verification groups verification operations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Immediately after signature and entry into force of the cease-fire, CCFA takes office

Preparation of the plan for formation of the Angolan Armed Forces, within the framework of CCFA

Observations

15 June 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

The monitoring groups conclude their establishment at the predetermined sites and notify CMVF that they are operational

United Nations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Observations

30 June 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Last day for the parties to communicate to the verification groups and the monitoring groups the timetable and schedules for movement of their forces to the areas of assembly and border posts

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

United Nations

Completion of the installation of the United Nations verification system

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Observations

Phase III (1 July-1 August 1991)

(Transfer of forces)

1 July 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Beginning of movement of forces to areas of assembly and border posts

Beginning of border control operations at border posts

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

Beginning of monitoring operations by the monitoring groups

United Nations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Observations

1 July-1 August 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

The monitoring groups inform CMVF of movement to each area of assembly and border posts

United Nations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Observations

1 August 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Last day to conclude movement of forces to areas of assembly and border posts

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

United Nations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Observations

Phase IV (1 August 1991-date of elections)

(Verification and monitoring of agreement)

1 August 1991

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

The parties report to the monitoring bodies regarding personnel to be demobilized

The parties report to the monitoring bodies regarding material to be delivered to storehouses

Replacement of FAPLA and FALA platoons at border posts by forces to be determined by the parties

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

United Nations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

The parties report to the monitoring bodies regarding the personnel and material from each area of assembly intended for the process of formation of the Angolan Armed Forces as a result of general directives from CCFA

Movement of personnel and material from areas of assembly to centres for formation of the Angolan Armed Forces being monitored by the monitoring groups

Observations

Date of general elections

Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

Last day for abolition of FAPLA and FALA

Monitoring mechanism

Government/UNITA

Last day for closing the areas of assembly

Abolition of bodies for verification and monitoring of the cease-fire

United Nations

Formation process

Angolan Armed Forces

Last day for concluding the process of formation of the Angolan Armed Forces

Abolition of CCFA

Observations

Attachment II

Fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola

Point 1

Recognition by UNITA of the Angolan State, of President José Eduardo dos Santos and of the Angolan Government until the general elections are held.

Point 2

At the moment the cease-fire enters into force, UNITA will acquire the right to conduct and freely participate in political activities in accordance with the revised Constitution and the pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy.

Point 3

The Angolan Government will hold discussions with all political forces in order to survey their opinions concerning the proposed changes in the Constitution. The Angolan Government will then work with all the parties to draft the laws that will regulate the electoral process.

Point 4

Free and fair elections for a new Government will take place following voter registration conducted under the supervision of international elections observers, who will remain in Angola until they certify that the elections were free and fair and that the results have been officially announced. At the time of the signature of the cease-fire, the parties will determine the period within which free and fair elections must be held. The exact date of said elections will be established through consultation with all political forces in Angola.

Point 5

Respect for human rights and basic freedoms, including the right of free association.

Point 6

The process of creating the National Army will begin with the entry into force of the cease-fire and will be concluded on the date of the elections, under terms to be agreed on between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA. The neutrality of the National Army in the electoral process will be guaranteed by the Angolan parties, acting within the framework of CCPM, with the support of the international monitoring group.

Point 7

Declaration and entry into force of the cease-fire throughout Angolan territory, in accordance with the agreement to be concluded on this subject between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA.

Annex

1. The Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA agree to the formation of a Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM), to be established at Luanda at the time of the signature of the "Fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola".

2. CCPM shall be composed of representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and of UNITA as members, and by representatives of Portugal, the United States, and the Soviet Union as observers. In addition, a representative of the United Nations may be invited to participate in the meetings of CCPM.

3. It shall be the task of CCPM to see that the peace accords are applied, thereby guaranteeing strict compliance with all political and military understandings, and to make the final decision on possible violations of those accords.

4. CCPM shall have the authority necessary to approve all the rules relating to its functioning, particularly its own internal regulations. Its decisions will be made by consensus between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA.

Attachment III

Concepts for resolving the issues still pending between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

1. At the moment the cease-fire enters into force, UNITA will acquire the right to conduct and freely participate in political activities in accordance with the revised Constitution and the pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy. At the time of the signature of the cease-fire, the parties will determine the period within which they must hold free and fair elections. The exact date of said elections will be established through consultation with all political forces in Angola.

2. The Angolan Government will hold discussions with all political forces in order to survey their opinions concerning proposed changes in the Constitution. The Angolan Government will then work with all the parties to draft the laws that will regulate the electoral process.

3. The cease-fire agreement will oblige the parties to cease receiving lethal material. The United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and all other countries will support the implementation of the cease-fire and will refrain from furnishing lethal material to any of the Angolan parties.

4. Overall political supervision of the cease-fire process will be the responsibility of the Angolan parties, acting within the framework of CCPM. Verification of the cease-fire will be the responsibility of the international monitoring group. The United Nations will be invited to send monitors to support the Angolan parties, at the request of the Government of Angola. The Governments that are to send monitors will be chosen by the Angolan parties, acting within the framework of CCPM.

5. The process of creating the National Army will begin with the entry into force of the cease-fire and will be concluded on the date of the elections. The neutrality of the National Army in the electoral process will be guaranteed by the Angolan parties, acting within the framework of CCPM, with the support of the international monitoring group. The Angolan parties reserve for later negotiations the discussions on the foreign assistance that may be necessary in order to form the National Army.

6. Free and fair elections for the new Government will take place under the supervision of international elections observers, who will remain in Angola until they certify that the elections were free and fair and that the results have been officially announced.

Attachment IV

Protocol of Estoril

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA, meeting at Estoril, Portugal, with the Portuguese Government as mediator and in the presence of observers from the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have reached the following agreements and understandings regarding political and military matters:

I. Elections

II. The Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM)

III. Principles relating to the issue of internal security during the period between the entry into force of the cease-fire and the holding of elections

IV. Political rights to be exercised by UNITA following the cease-fire

V. Administrative structures

VI. Formation of the Angolan armed forces

I. ELECTIONS

1. Elections will take place in Angola to choose the President of the Republic and the National Assembly. The question of whether or not these elections will be held simultaneously will be decided through consultations among all Angolan political forces.

2. The President will be elected by direct and secret suffrage, through a majority system, with recourse to a second round, if necessary.

3. The National Assembly will be elected by direct and secret suffrage, through a system of proportional representation at the national level.

4. The elections will be preceded by an official election campaign period, the duration of which will be determined following a process of consultations involving all Angolan political forces. A technical opinion from a specialized international body such as the United Nations, for example, will be obtained on the question of the desirable duration of the election campaign in Angola. That opinion, however, will not be considered binding by any of the parties.

5. All Angolan citizens of adult age may vote, participate in the election campaign, and stand for election without any discrimination or intimidation. The definition of what is to be understood as "adult age" will be dealt with

in the election law, to be drafted following the cease-fire, after a process of consultations between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and all Angolan political forces.

6. The voting will be secret, and special provisions will be made for those who cannot read or write. These provisions will be included in the election law, to be drafted following the cease-fire, after a process of consultations between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and all Angolan political forces.

7. All political parties and interested persons will have the opportunity to organize and to participate in the elections process on an equal footing, regardless of their political positions.

8. Total freedom of expression, association, and access to the media will be guaranteed.

9. The parties have accepted the tripartite proposal by the delegations of Portugal in its capacity of mediator, and the United States and the Soviet Union as observers, to the effect that 1 September to 30 November 1992 will be the period within which free and fair elections should be held in Angola, the cease-fire being signed in May 1991. The parties have reached an understanding that the following tripartite declaration is to be taken into consideration in the discussion of the precise date for the holding of elections:

> "Taking into consideration the logistical difficulties in organizing the elections process, specifically the desirability that the elections be held during the dry season, and the need to reduce the high costs that the international community will have to bear in monitoring the cease-fire, the delegations of Portugal, the United States and the Soviet Union heartily recommend that the elections be held during the first part of the suggested period, preferably between 1 September and 1 October 1992."

II. JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMISSION (CCPM)

1. According to the document entitled "Concepts for resolving the issues still pending between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA", and the annex to the "Fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola", the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) has as its mission the overall political supervision of the cease-fire process. It will have the duty to see that the Peace Accords are applied, thereby guaranteeing strict compliance with all political and military understandings, and to make the final decision on possible violations of those Accords.

2. CCPM will have the authority necessary to approve all rules relating to its own functioning, particularly its own internal regulations. Its decisions will be made by consensus between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA, after hearing the opinion of the Observers.

Sole paragraph. CCPM does not seek to replace the Government of the People's Republic of Angola.

3. In the light of the foregoing, CCPM, with headquarters in Luanda, should structure itself so as to:

3.1 Guarantee the conditions of peace for the holding of free, fair, multi-party, and internationally verifiable elections;

3.2 Ensure the fulfilment of all the political understandings resulting from the Peace Accords relating to the electoral process;

3.3 Supervise the implementation of the Cease-Fire Agreement within the framework of the Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) and cooperate with the representatives of the United Nations;

3.4 Inform itself about possible threats to the territorial integrity of the country;

3.5 Discuss, within the sphere of its authority, questions relating to Angolan exiles.

4. CCPM is to be constituted at the time of the signature of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

5. CCPM shall be composed of representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and of UNITA as members, and by representatives of Portugal, the United States and the Soviet Union as observers. The United Nations may be represented, in the capacity of invited guest.

5.1 Members and observers shall be supported by assistants and technical advisers for the areas assigned to them, namely:

(a) Joint Cease-Fire Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF);

(b) Joint Commission for the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA);

(c) The Political Commission.

Sole paragraph. In the case of the members of CCPM, the assistants and technical advisers will have to be Angolans.

6. The meetings of CCPM shall be presided over, alternately in accordance with the principle of rotation, by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and by UNITA, without prejudice to the principle of consensus in the decision-making process.

7. It shall be the responsibility of CCPM to draft its internal regulations, as well as to determine its budget.

8. The mandate of CCPM ends on the date the elected Government takes office.

III. PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE ISSUE OF INTERNAL SECURITY DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS

1. All Angolans shall have the right to conduct and participate in political activities without intimidation, in accordance with the revised Constitution and pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy, and the provisions of the Peace Accords.

2.1 The neutrality of the police, whose functions and activities are the responsibility of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, shall be the object of verification and monitoring by teams of monitors composed of two members designated by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, two members designated by UNITA and one expert in police affairs to be designated by and subordinate to the United Nations command structure.

2.2 Within the sphere of their authority, the monitoring teams shall have as their specific mandate the duty to visit police facilities, examine their activities, and investigate possible violations of political rights committed by the police. These teams may move freely throughout the entire territory of Angola.

2.3 The monitoring teams are subordinate to CCPM, and must submit reports of their activities to that body.

2.4 In principle, there will be three monitoring teams for each Angolan province. CCPM may modify the number of monitoring teams in accordance with the needs of each province.

3.1 Consonant with the invitation from the Government, UNITA will participate in the police force that is responsible for maintaining public order.

3.2 To that end, shortly after entry into force of the cease-fire, and as a means of strengthening trust between the parties, the availability of vacancies in the ranks of the police force to be filled by personnel designated by UNITA will be guaranteed, and those personnel will be given appropriate training.

4. UNITA will be responsible for the personal safety of its highest-ranking leaders. The Government of the People's Republic of Angola will grant police status to the members of UNITA in charge of guaranteeing that safety.

IV. POLITICAL RIGHTS TO BE EXERCISED BY UNITA FOLLOWING THE CEASE-FIRE

1. According to the provisions contained in the document entitled "Concepts for resolving the issues still pending between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA", and in the document on "Fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola", at the time of entry into force of the cease-fire, UNITA will acquire the right to conduct and freely participate in political activities, according to the revised Constitution and the pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy, particularly including the following rights:

(a) Freedom of expression;

(b) The right to present, publish and freely debate its political programme;

(c) The right to recruit and enrol members;

(d) The right to hold meetings and demonstrations;

(e) The right of access to the government media;

(f) The right to free movement and personal safety of its members;

(g) The right to present candidates in the elections;

(h) The right to open headquarters and representative offices anywhere in Angola.

2. Without prejudice to the stipulations of the previous paragraph, which permit UNITA to exercise those rights immediately, UNITA must, after entry into force of the cease-fire, satisfy the formal requirements for its registration as a political party pursuant to the "Political Parties Law" of the People's Republic of Angola.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES

1. Both parties accept the principle of the extension of the Central Administration to those areas of Angola that are presently beyond the range of its authority.

2. Both parties recognize that such extension must not be made abruptly or endanger the free circulation of persons and goods, the activities of the political forces, and the execution of the tasks related to the electoral process.

3. Both parties agree to leave for a later date the study of the actual implementation of such extension, which will be carried out within the framework of CCPM by competent teams composed of representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA. Those teams may have recourse to international technical advisers.

VI. FORMATION OF THE ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES

A. Identification and general principles

Whereas the peace process between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA presupposes the need to form armed forces,

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA agree to the following:

1. An Angolan Armed Forces shall be formed.

2. The Angolan Armed Forces:

(a) Shall have as their overall mission the defence and safeguarding of independence and territorial integrity;

(b) May, in compliance with provisions of law, perform other missions of general interest that are the responsibility of the State, or collaborate in tasks related to satisfying the basic needs and improving the quality of life of the population, without prejudice to the aforesaid overall mission;

(c) Shall be composed exclusively of Angolan citizens; furthermore, its organizational structure is unitary for the entire territory;

(d) Shall have such composition, high command structure, troops, mechanisms, and equipment as determined in accordance with foreseeable external threats and the country's socio-economic conditions;

(e) Are non-partisan and obey the competent organs of sovereignty, within the principle of subordination to political authority;

(f) Swear publicly to respect the Constitution and other laws of the Republic.

3. Members of the military on active duty shall enjoy active voting status, but may not use their duties or the structural units of the Angolan Armed Forces to interfere in any other partisan political or union activities.

4. The process of formation of the Armed Forces shall begin with the entry into force of the cease-fire and end on the date of the elections.

5. The process of formation of the Armed Forces shall evolve simultaneously with the assembly, disarmament, and integration into civilian life of the troops that are gradually being demobilized as a consequence of the cease-fire.

6. Recruitment into the Angolan Armed Forces during the period prior to the elections shall proceed in accordance with the principle of free will, drawing from the ranks of troops that are now part of FAPLA and FALA.

7. It is mandatory that all military personnel incorporated into the Angolan Armed Forces prior to the date of the elections, attend professional training courses with a view to achieving unification in terms of doctrine and procedure that is conducive to the development of an essential esprit de corps.

8. The neutrality of the Armed Forces during the period prior to the holding of the elections shall be guaranteed by the Angolan parties acting within the framework of CCPM and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces (CCFA).

9. By the time the elections are held, only the Angolan Armed Forces shall exist; there may be no other troops whatsoever. All members of the present armed forces of each party who do not become members of the Angolan Armed Forces shall be demobilized prior to the holding of elections.

10. Both parties agree that individual rights acquired by military personnel of the Angolan Armed Forces during the period prior to the elections shall continue to be assured, and that the structural units created up to that point to consolidate those same Armed Forces shall be safeguarded.

11. The units of the Angolan Armed Forces shall be formed beginning at the platoon level.

B. Troop strength

1. The parties agree that the troop strength of the Angolan Armed Forces by the time of the elections shall be as follows:

Army	40 000
Air Force	6 000
Navy	4 000

2. Army personnel shall be distributed in accordance with the following plan:

- 15,000 operations soldiers, 7,200 of whom shall belong to the Military Regions, 4,800 to the Army General Reserve and 3,000 to the Special Forces;

- 15,000 soldiers for support services and administration;

- 6,000 non-commissioned officers;

- 4,000 officers.

3. Each of the parties shall provide the Army with a total of 20,000 men, distributed as follows:

- 15,000 soldiers, of whom 7,500 are to be operations personnel;

- 3,000 non-commissioned officers;

- 2,000 officers.

4. The first troops assigned to the Air Force and Navy shall be furnished from the respective branches of the FAPLA, inasmuch as FALA does not have such units. As soon as the process of training the Angolan Armed Forces begins, UNITA will be able to participate in the Air Force and Navy under terms to be defined within the framework of CCFA.

5. The Navy and the Air Force shall be subject to verification and monitoring, without prejudice to their being permitted to carry out controlled missions as a means of assuring their operationality and the defence of economic interests. As soon as the Navy and the Air Force units become part of the Angolan Armed Forces, they shall be subordinate to the High Command of the Angolan Armed Forces.

C. Command structures of the Angolan Armed Forces

1. General principles

(a) A Joint Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces (CCFA) shall exist, created specifically to direct the process of formation of the Angolan Armed Forces and subordinate to the CCPM;

(b) The Angolan Armed Forces Command Structure, including the High Command of the Angolan Armed Forces and the commands of the three branches (Army, Air Force and Navy) is shown on the diagram in the annex;

(c) The entire command structure of the Angolan Armed Forces, although derived during the period of its formation from FAPLA and FALA, is to become strictly non-partisan and will receive directives and orders from only CCPM, CCFA and the Angolan Armed Forces chain of command;

(d) Appointments to the Angolan Armed Forces High Command and the commands of the three branches of the Angolan Armed Forces are to be proposed by CCFA and approved by CCPM;

(e) The logistics of the Angolan Armed Forces shall be joint, and a Logistical and Infrastructure Command, subordinate to the High Command of the Angolan Armed Forces, shall be created for this purpose.

2. Joint Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces

(a) CCFA, which is directly subordinate to CCPM, constitutes the transitional body, until the date of the elections, between the political-military echelon and the Angolan Armed Forces echelon;

(b) CCFA is to be composed of representatives of FAPLA and FALA as members, assisted by representatives of the country(ies) selected to advise them during the formation process of the Angolan Armed Forces;

(c) The duties of CCFA shall be as follows; however, other duties may be assigned to it by CCPM:

- Propose to CCPM the rules applicable to the Angolan Armed Forces;
- Propose to CCPM the budget to be allocated to the Angolan Armed Forces [for the period] prior to the elections;
- Undertake strategic planning for the Angolan Armed Forces [during the period] prior to the elections;
- Propose to CCPM the criteria for selecting personnel from FAPLA and FALA for purposes of forming the Angolan Armed Forces;
- Propose to CCPM the names of the principal commanding officers of FAA, down to and including the brigade echelon;
- Draft directives concerning the phasing of the process of staffing the structural units of FAA.

3. Angolan Armed Forces High Command

(a) The overall mission of the High Command of the Angolan Armed Forces is to detail the generic directives received from CCFA, with a view to staffing the structural units and supporting the forces;

(b) The High Command is composed [during the period] prior to the elections, of two general officers having equal rank, designated by each of the parties. Its decisions shall be valid only when signed by those two general officers;

(c) The High Command is assisted by the Angolan Armed Forces General Staff (EMGFAA), which shall have at least the following staff units, headed by general officers or by field officers:

Office staff;

Planning and organization staff;

Military doctrine and instruction staff;

Legislation staff;

Information staff;

Public relations staff;

Justice and discipline staff;

Operations staff.

4. Army Command

(a) The Army Command shall be structured in due course by the High Command of the Angolan Armed Forces, within the framework of CCFA, and subject to approval by CCPM;

(b) The structure of the Army Command shall accommodate the military regions and military zone(s) in a position directly subordinate to the General Army Chief of Staff (CEME), whose duties are yet to be defined, but which may include: organizing and preparing the forces, training, justice and discipline and logistical support to the assigned forces;

(c) Each military region shall be commanded by a Commanding General, assisted by a Deputy General and by a Headquarters General. The Military Zones shall be commanded by general officers;

(d) The headquarters of the military regions and zone(s) are as follows:

Northern Military Region, with headquarters in Uige;

Central Military Region, in Huambo;

Eastern Military Region, in Luena;

Southern Military Region, in Lubango;

The Cabinda Military Zone;

(e) The system of forces shall be constituted on the basis of units at the brigade level and other forces that may be assigned to the military regions/zone(s) or maintained in the Army Reserve or the Angolan Armed Forces Reserve.

5. Air Force

The Air Force shall be formed on the basis of the FAPLA Air Force, in accordance with the provision in section B, items 4 and 5 above. The details will be contained in directives issued by CCFA.

6. Navy

The Navy shall be formed on the basis of the FAPLA navy, in accordance with the provision in section B, items 4 and 5 above. The details will be contained in directives to be issued by CCFA.

7. Logistical and Infrastructure Command

(a) The Logistical and Infrastructure Command is to be created, and is to be directly subordinate to the High Command of the Angolan Armed Forces;

(b) The Logistical and Infrastructure Command shall have as its overall function to plan and propose administrative and logistical support for the Angolan Armed Forces and guarantee that it is provided to the Angolan Armed Forces via common services. In particular, it will be responsible for the logistics of production and procurement;

(c) The Logistical and Infrastructure Command is to be commanded by a General, assisted by a Second Commander (a general officer) and by a General Staff that, initially, will include the following:

- Infrastructure Staff;

- Common Services Staff;

- Re-equipment Staff;

- Finance Staff;

(d) The Logistical and Infrastructure Command has command over those support units that may be assigned to it.

8. Phasing and establishing the timetable for the process

(a) The process of forming the Angolan Armed Forces shall proceed in phases, as follows:

- First phase: appointment of CCFA - prior to the entry into force of the cease-fire;

- Second phase: appointment of the Angolan Armed Forces High Command;

- Third phase: appointment of the commands of the subunits;

- Fourth phase: appointment of the commanders of the Military Regions and the brigade commanders;

- Fifth phase: appointment of the commands of the three branches;

(b) Immediately following the appointment of each command, the respective General Staffs are to be organized;

(c) The administrative and logistical support system is organized within the principle of transformation, without loss or rupture of existing structures, in accordance with EMGFAA plans approved by CCFA.

D. Technical assistance from foreign countries

The parties will inform the Portuguese Government, not later than the date of notification of their acceptance of the Accords, as to which country or countries will be invited to render assistance in the Angolan Armed Forces formation process.

E. Demobilization

The accommodation of the demobilized forces constitutes a national problem that must be studied jointly by the two parties and submitted to CCPM for review and a decision. The same treatment should be given the problem of people who have been physically disabled by the war.

ANNEX
ANEXO

DIAGRAM OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES
ESBOÇO DE ESTRUTURA DAS FORÇAS ARMADAS ANGOLANAS